VIDKUN QUISLING

MEMORANDUM ON THE RUSSIAN QUESTION

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

INTRODUCTION [Originally written in Russian by Neues Europa]

This document reflects the views of the Norwegian Führer, Vidkun Quisling, on the geopolitical solution to the problem of conquering Russia and the formulation of an Eastern policy, as substantively outlined by him - an expert on Eastern Europe who, among other things, lived and worked in Soviet Russia for about ten years.

In describing the problem, Quisling draws on the ideas of General Clausewitz and Bismarck, as well as Napoleon's mistakes - which consisted, in particular, of his rejection of the peasantry's struggle for liberation from serfdom - and also takes into account the historical experience of conquests in the Russian sphere: Norman, Mongol-Tatar, and Jewish - as he sees the rise of Bolshevism to power. Thus, he is convinced that the conquest of Russia is impossible by purely military means, without mobilizing the broad masses of the people and establishing a liberation struggle against Bolshevism.

Noteworthy is his view of Russia as an empire of the past, to which he acknowledged national rights and rights to the conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries. Furthermore, the text includes the phrase "true, real Russia" (German: eigentliche Russland), which he used to delineate the ethnic Russian territory in contrast to the conquered lands in Europe and Asia. In his memorandum, Quisling proposes the creation of a national Russian federal government (German: nationale russische Bundesregierung), based on the principles of the National Socialist Russian movement and bound by a strong alliance with Germany. He also addresses in detail the future of other Eastern European nations, to which he recognized the right to independence, and expresses doubts regarding the issue of German colonization.

It is important to note that the memorandum made its way onto the desks of nearly all high-ranking Reich officials. Hans Fredrik Dahl, a Norwegian historian and renowned biographer of Vidkun Quisling, writes: "[The document] was forwarded to Terboven to be sent to the Führer. Terboven read the document carefully and concluded that Quisling was clearly an expert in this situation (…). Terboven circulated the document to other departments, including a copy to Gottlob Berger at SS headquarters in Berlin, who, in turn, forwarded a copy to Himmler at his headquarters in East Prussia. The Wehrmacht High Command received a copy from von Falkenhorst's headquarters. Goebbels also received a copy and noted in his diary that "Quisling demonstrates clear and objective judgment here." Rosenberg and his colleagues, naturally, also received copies. Quisling himself intended to take one of them with him to his next meeting with Hitler, which was scheduled for February 1943. "Denkschrift" is just one of several documents outlining Quisling's vision for a German conquest. Vast territories were in the process of being conquered, and the question of how they would be divided, administered, settled, and

developed in the future was one of the most hotly debated issues in the comprehensive German Ostpolitik and Ostforschung, as well as the subject of notorious rivalry between various departments of the Third Reich: Hitler himself, his party leader Bormann, Rosenberg's Eastern Office, Ribbentrop and the Foreign Ministry, Göring's Four-Year Plan, Himmler's SS empire, Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry, as well as the Wehrmacht in all its various combinations."[1]

1 «Quisling: A Study in Treachery» (1999), Hans Fredrik Dahl.

Memorandum on the Russian Issue – Vidkun Quisling, February 2, 1943

1. The reorganization and unification of Europe in these global conflicts serves as both the most important means of war and the most important goal of war. We are waging war not only to defeat England and America, but also to lay the foundations for a new, united Europe under German leadership. At the same time, however, such a continental system is linked to the East Asian region of Japan, the means by which, together with the achievements of the submarine forces, the naval power of England and America can be broken and the war won.

For the Axis powers, above all Germany, this is a matter of uniting Europe against England and America. Germany has already gradually seized the western half of the continent and is now using this base to conquer the eastern half, Russia. This is the foundation of a victorious war against England and America.

The Bolsheviks in Moscow, however, have their own similar and even more far-reaching plans. As the masters of Russia, they now seek to subjugate and Bolshevize Western Europe, and then, under the banner of world revolution, use this Bolshevized Europe against their current allies, England and America.

The fate of the world will be decided in Russia. The Russian question is the central issue in today's world politics. Everything must be assessed from this perspective, and all forces must be concentrated, as far as possible, against this center of gravity. The goal is to win the war in Russia and take control of the country for our own purposes.

2. However, Russia is a country that cannot be formally conquered and occupied by the forces of today's European states without securing the support of the population. Even Germany's immense military power might not be sufficient for this purpose, since, based on experience regarding the balance of forces required for a heavy occupation - such as would be necessary in Russia under these circumstances - the occupation of all of Russia would require about 100 troops per 10,000 inhabitants, i.e., nearly 2 million troops for a permanent occupation and, of course, far more for a conquest. A country of such size and climate can be conquered only by exploiting internal divisions and held only by establishing a national, union government.

After Trafalgar, when plans to invade England and Egypt had to be abandoned, Napoleon resorted to the Continental System to defeat England. He wanted to cut off the British from the continent in order to destroy their trade and unite Europe against them. The foundation of this policy was an alliance with Russia. When Russia broke the alliance, it had to be restored by force, through war. However, as General Clausewitz notes in his book „On War" („Vom Kriege"), Russia was already at that time an empire that could be defeated only by exploiting its internal contradictions and weaknesses, and not by purely military means, not even with the help of the 500,000 men Napoleon brought for this purpose. Among other things, he was urged to incite the majority of the Russian people to revolt against their own government, capitalizing on the rural population's desire for freedom, and the peasants in most villages pleaded with him to do so. He refused, ostensibly because of the horrors and chaos that the liberation of these crude and uncivilized masses would bring upon the country. He knew what the French Revolution was like from his own experience.

However, after the Russian campaign, he told his former ambassador in St. Petersburg: "I was not mistaken about the aims and political expediency of this war, but about the way it was conducted."

In World War I, Russia's power was finally broken by political means, not just military force. But, unfortunately, all the work was done by the Bolsheviks alone, not by Germany.

To achieve victory in the East, the war in Russia must be waged simultaneously with political and military means. It is necessary to strike at the political weak points of Bolshevik rule, to transform the war into a war of liberation from the Bolshevik yoke, and to deprive Moscow of the opportunity to present the war as a desperate national struggle for land, freedom, and the fatherland. In other words, there is an urgent need to initiate a war policy in Russia analogous to the policy of Nationalist China, which Japan is evidently practicing with some success in East Asia. A national counter-government must be formed against the Soviet government, just as a national counter-government was formed in China against the Chiang Kai-shek regime

3. Such a policy in Russia must rely primarily on the true Russia, that is, on the Russian state-forming people (German: das russische Staatsvolk), the Great Russians. To rely exclusively on national minorities is tantamount to trying to hold a rifle by its bayonet tip. Of course, minorities must also be mobilized to fight Bolshevism - not only the border peoples in the West, on the borders of Europe, but also the Caucasian peoples, as well as the Finnish and Turkic-Tatar national minorities. But the main emphasis must be placed on Russia itself, since that is where the center of gravity of Bolshevism lies, its hotbed and stronghold. Limiting the mobilization against Bolshevism to national minorities alone will not lead to any lasting political result; on the contrary, it will give the Bolsheviks even

greater opportunity to exploit Russian (Great Russian) nationalism in the service of their own interests.

In particular, it would be a mistake to base the internal Russian struggle against Bolshevism primarily on Ukraine's struggle against Russia.

In 1918, Germany occupied the Baltic states, western Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. But Bolshevism remained alive in its true stronghold - Great Russia. With it at their backs, they turned to fruitless large-scale attacks in the West, as a result of which Red propaganda undermined Germany's resistance and led to total collapse. Cooperation with Ukrainian circles in 1917–18 failed completely. On the other hand, thanks to an alliance with national Russia and the complete suppression of Bolshevism, Germany could likely have won the war against the Allies or, at the very least, secured favorable peace terms. Choosing the correct strategic line of conduct for the war is of decisive importance for the outcome of the Great War. If this line is chosen correctly, errors in the details become relatively harmless. Even a major defeat need not necessarily be catastrophic. If, however, a serious strategic error is made in the choice of military policy, then even any military advances throughout most of the war will ultimately easily turn into a final and decisive defeat.

4. Bismarck's successful foreign policy system consisted, as is well known, of a dual alliance with Austria, expanded into a Triple Alliance with Italy and reinforced by a reinsurance treaty (German: Rückversicherungsvertrag) between Germany and Russia.

Bismarck pursued this idea throughout his life. He believed that it was impossible to find a political system that would better protect Germany from the Western democracies. Adolf Hitler completed Bismarck's work regarding unity and the formation of the Reich in Germany. He also succeeded in creating, in a modern form, an expanded and more complete realization of the first two elements of Bismarck's foreign policy strategy, namely: first, the merger of the spheres of influence of Germany and the former Austria-Hungary, naturally extending to Scandinavia and the Balkans; second, an alliance between this expanded Central European bloc and Italy, as well as the now-defeated France.

All that remains is to implement the third and most important element of this policy - to build a bridge into the sphere of Russian influence. This was done on a temporary basis in 1939, but was interrupted by the defeat of the Bolsheviks in 1941. It is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that Bismarck's system remains the most effective policy imaginable, indeed the only one that seems truly appropriate, since it alone corresponds to the nature of things and the driving forces of European development. The fact that Germany and Russia must fight each other is an anomaly of the current world order, a necessity for which Bolshevism and world Jewry are solely to blame. Germany and Russia have absolutely no interest in waging war against each other. On the contrary, in reality they are interested in working together. Germany, Russia, and Japan are, of course, allies against the

Anglo-Saxon Jewish world powers. When Russia's great Asian interests are emphasized - and these are indeed Russia's great interests - England immediately emerges as a known enemy. Count Witte, the famous Prime Minister of Russia, said: "England is our chief enemy, for it has always been the adversary of every free-breathing great power."

Therefore, the task is to mobilize Russia's national forces to fight Bolshevism and to wage war in the East relying as much as possible on the country's own resources. Instead of fighting against Germany in an unnatural and destructive war in the interests of England and the Jews, Russia must turn against England and the Jews, who have been the source of its misfortune. In other words, it is necessary to build up a reserve of strength in the East for waging war, rather than a constantly increasing and, in the end, possibly fatal drain on resources.

Of course, at the same time, the necessary economic cooperation must be ensured and an order established that will eliminate or limit the Russian threat, and which can form the basis for future peaceful cooperation between the two halves of Europe.

A modern and more advanced reinterpretation of Bismarck's historical policy involves the creation of a major European continental bloc, comprising the Western and Eastern European halves of Russia, in alliance with Japan, to counter the Western plutocracies dominated by Jews. Five hundred million people under Germanic leadership in a self-sufficient territory, with solid, natural borders and a central geopolitical expanse!

5. The successful realization of this European and Greater German idea will bring victory and ensure it. Napoleon faced a similar task, but he erred and fell. The peoples of Europe cannot be united and subjugated at the same time, and, as has already been noted, Russia cannot be conquered through a war of aggression against the entire Russian people. Europe must be united and pacified through adequate and timely concessions to the national freedom and independence of the individual peoples of these states, and the Russian people - first and foremost, true national Russia - must also be drawn in as an active participant. In the long term, Germany, with its 80 million Germans, would find itself in a very difficult position, trapped in a blockaded Europe where the British and the Bolsheviks would have the opportunity to play on the awakened national sentiments of 300 to 500 million Europeans and Russians against Germany.

6. A discussion of the organization of Western Europe is beyond the scope of this memorandum; but one crucial issue must be addressed here, one that most closely concerns both Europe and Russia, and on which clear lines must be drawn in order to establish a solid working basis for resolving the Russian problem, namely: the definition of the border between Western Europe and Russia, if not officially and publicly, then in principle.

Under the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Soviet government, under which Germany advanced eastward as far as the German Army High Command (Hindenburg-Ludendorff) deemed necessary for Germany's military security, Russia was required to recognize the independence of Finland and Ukraine, as well as relinquish the Baltic states and Poland. Romania was also permitted to consolidate its hold on Bessarabia. These conditions applied to the Bolsheviks as well, with whom, according to the correct assessment of the Army High Command, the state of war could never end. The Army High Command was not interested in further weakening Russia. Rather, they hoped that the restoration of the Russian Empire would begin with Ukraine, and considered it possible to go even further and return not only Ukraine but also Latvia and Estonia to the fold of a new, consolidated Russia. He (Ludendorff) even considered a Russian-Polish solution to the Polish question "probably the best" (German: "denkbar liebste") for Germany. Now Poland had finally become part of the Greater German Reich. Thus, the Polish question was resolved, which significantly strengthened Germany's (and Europe's) position in the East.

Under these circumstances, one could have settled for Frest's solution, i.e., ceding Lithuania and Courland (the Duna Line) to Germany and Bessarabia to Romania, but returning Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and the Ukrainians to a national Russia united with Germany.

Such a solution would have united the Russian people in its three tribes (German: drei Stämmen) (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians) within a single border and thereby satisfied Great Russian nationalist sentiments. The same applies to the preservation of Peter the Great's Baltic conquests (Estonia and Latvia).

However, there are very serious objections to such an arrangement.

First, the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine have the right to an independent, nation-state existence. They would not have been able to enjoy this for long under Moscow's rule, because if Great Russia could have relied fully on its former western provinces, the people's activism there would soon have been subjected to overwhelming Russification.

Second, if Russia retains control over Belarus and Ukraine, in a few years it will become so powerful that relations between Russia and its western neighbors will change completely, and Europe will once again face an imminent Russian threat.

On the other hand, Russia will not be able to rest easy if it loses all of Ukraine's territory.

Given the large Russian minority in Ukraine, the blurred distinction between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, historical traditions, economic ties, porous borders, Russia's demographic strength, and its dominant influence in Eastern Europe - as clearly demonstrated by Russian history - the secession of all of Ukraine also does not provide a favorable foundation for a stable order. Unless all of Russia (Greater Russia) is fully integrated into the new European order. Given Russia's size and the fundamental

difference between Western Europe and Russia as the Western and Eastern worlds - a difference that may take centuries to overcome - such an immediate and complete integration of Russia into Europe is a highly doubtful prospect, if it is even possible without Russia gradually seizing leadership in Europe. Russia's great-power interests, along with Pan-Slavism, would immediately become deeply entangled in Central European relations - precisely what should be avoided.

7. Under these circumstances, another solution almost inevitably emerges, namely the Dnieper River, which serves as the historical and natural eastern border of Western Europe and which, nearly 150 years ago (in 1772), also served as a state border with Russia. As a result, this divided the current territory of Ukraine into two parts: the Western European part, Ukraine west of the Dnieper, and the Russian part east of it. But this division is entirely justified.

Even from a national perspective, there is little to object to. The right (western) bank of the Dnieper is, in fact, Ukraine. After the Tatars ravaged the country, it was repopulated by settlers from Galicia and Carpathian Rus. The Ukrainians there should be viewed as settlers who, strictly speaking, have very little in common with Russia. Moreover, the right bank of the Dnieper was conquered by Russia only at the end of the 18th century. The spiritual foundations of Ukrainian national identity were laid in the 15th century in the Volhynia-Galicia region, during complex political and religious conflicts with Poland and Catholicism. And in the 19th century, the revival of Ukrainian national identity was also centered on the right bank of the Dnieper, specifically in Eastern Galicia. At that time, it was part of Austria, which sought to support and exploit the Ukrainian national movement against Russia.

As for the part of Ukraine east of the Dnieper, it is, for the most part, a territory of Russian (Muscovite) colonization, largely populated by Great Russians, not least in the Donetsk region. This fact is further underscored by the fact that in recent years the Bolsheviks have been attempting to quietly eliminate the Ukrainian national movement in every region. Furthermore, from a transportation and economic standpoint, the eastern bank of the Dnieper is strongly linked to Russia in the north and east, while the western bank has natural western ties to Europe.

It should also be noted that Russians and Ukrainians themselves widely use this division into the Right-Bank and Left-Bank regions of the Dnieper (Pravodneprovye and Levodneprovye). The Bolsheviks' economic division of the Soviet Union envisaged the same distinction, namely into the so-called "Southwestern Region" with its capital in Kyiv and the so-called "Southern Ore-Industrial Region" with its capital in Kharkiv, which was to include the Kryvyi Rih ore region.

The only complex arrangement is that Ostland (the Baltic states and Belarus) and Ukraine west of the Dnieper must be considered part of Western Europe and that they must be Europeanized (Germanized) and tied to the West by any means necessary. Ostland and

Ukraine must become two bastions which, like Finland and Crimea (see below), must encircle true Europe. “Ukraine” also means a border region, a “Mark,” and could just as well be a German border region as a Russian one. The creation of such strong military border states in the East must be a natural goal of German continental policy. In the interest of good relations, this will also prevent Germany and Russia from becoming immediate neighbors.

In particular, it would be advisable to establish closed Germanic military colonies in these border states, where German peasants and their families would be settled in separate areas. Such an arrangement is far more practical in every respect than maintaining troops and garrisons there. The centers of these colonies should be military garrisons composed of armed peasants subject to military service. Then, economic and cultural life will gradually develop around the garrison towns, transforming these colonies into Germanic centers of power and culture. In this process, this European Ukraine must develop as a true Ukrainian nation-state, distinct from the Poles and Russians. Every opportunity must be utilized to strengthen an independent Ukrainian national identity, for example, through Europeanization, the nationalization of the Ukrainian church (in Russia, the Russian church was the de facto bearer of the Great Russian national idea of unity), as well as the introduction of the Latin alphabet. The same applies to Belarus. The Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper, on the other hand, will become Russian. They could either form an autonomous Russian-Ukrainian republic within the Russian Federal Republic [German: der russischen Bundesrepublik] (see below), or become part of it as a region comprising separate (5–6) districts, similar to the current Kuban Region (Krasnodar Krai), where a Ukrainian population also resides today.

It would probably also be advisable to establish as clear-cut ethnographic boundaries as possible by relocating Russians from the western and eastern banks of the Dnieper and Ukrainians from the eastern to the western bank.

In this way, it may be possible to establish a strong and stable line of continental balance between Western Europe and Russia. The acceptance and consolidation of Eastern European territory west of this line is not an insurmountable task, while the eastern border of the current Ukrainian state and national territory must be rejected as untenable in the long term, and the Volga or Ural line all the more so. It is as if victorious France had wanted to push its borders as far as the Elbe. Napoleon attempted to do this with the help of his Confederation of the Rhine, with the well-known result. On the other hand, with the Dnieper as its border, Russia would lose the opportunity to develop independently as a world empire. National forces in Russia need this opportunity to create a Russia that is peaceful and friendly toward Germany. If all of so-called Western Russia - for the conquest of which a struggle raged throughout the 18th century at the cost of enormous sacrifices -

is lost, this will not affect the country's vital interests. On the contrary, as a result, Russia will become more homogeneous and gain internal stability and strength.

Above all, however, it will free itself from the fundamental political error and delusion that had the most profound impact on Russia's unfortunate development and, at the same time, formed the core of the "Pro-Russian threat." In essence, this was a fateful misstep in Russian policy - a shift toward an increasingly assertive "Great Power" [Ger. Großmachtpolitik] and conquests in the West, instead of promoting the cultural, social, and economic development of its own country and utilizing the immense opportunities offered by the vast territories and riches of the Russian East - measures that were so disastrously neglected in the past. The Great Russian Empire exceeded the limits of its natural right over the course of several generations following the conquest of western Ukraine and Poland.

8. The much-discussed cession of the Republic of Karelia (Eastern Karelia) to Finland, as well as the cession of the Autonomous Russian-Tatar Republic of Crimea and its organization as a Germanic colonial state (under German military administration), will likely also contribute to Russia's understanding of its own historical mission in rejecting Western plans for conquest. The cession of Eastern Karelia is justified from strategic and ethnic points of view (if not historical - Eastern Karelia has always belonged to Finland). The Crimean bastion (the Gibraltar of the Black Sea) was German-Gothic for most of its history, was then conquered by the Tatars and Turks, and only came under Russian rule in 1783. In particular, as regards the Kola Peninsula, which now forms the Murmansk Oblast (Gau) in the Russian Federation with a population of about 300,000 people, nothing justifies its transfer to Finland along with Karelia. Kola has never been Finnish and has no Finnish population. Kola belonged to Norway, and Norway laid claim to it until 1826. Murmansk is the Russian form of Normansk, and the entire Kola region was historically referred to as "Murmansk Land," that is, Norwegian land. Kola must either remain Russian (with the right of transit through Karelia via the Murmansk Railway), or become Norwegian, or be considered a joint Norwegian-German possession.

9. The three Transcaucasian republics - Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan - are composed of non-Russian ethnic groups with a strong sense of national identity and a long-standing national culture, at least as far as Georgia and Armenia are concerned. They were under Russian rule for nearly 100 years. With the exception of a portion of the industrial population settled in the Baku region, Russians are almost nowhere to be found, except for those serving in the army and, to some extent, in the administration. All three republics possess all the prerequisites for independent national existence, provided this is guaranteed by Germany and Russia and provided they are shielded from mutual disputes. This does not apply to the North Caucasus, which is essentially Russian, firmly and naturally

belonging to Russia, even if one can find there a few small mountainous republics with a non-native population. They may continue to exist as autonomous republics within Russia.

10. As for the other constituent republics of the Soviet Union - namely, the five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan - they should, of course, be transferred to the Russian Federattion as autonomous republics. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are areas of Russian settlement. In Kazakhstan, Russians already make up more than 30% of the population. The Turkestan republics should be viewed more as colonies or dominions, similar to the French overseas territories in North Africa.

11. Under the plan proposed here, the following territories would be separated from Russia: Eastern Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Western Ukraine [the Right Bank - ed.], Bessarabia, Crimea, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, with a total population of about 50 million people. What remains is Russia, with an area of about 20 million square kilometers and a population of about 140 million people, compared to approximately 360 million in Western Europe (excluding the British Isles).

We must work with this Russia, which still possesses all the prerequisites to become a world power. The goal is to free it from Bolshevism and integrate it as an active ally into the broader European continental system, where it naturally belongs. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the outcome of the war may depend on the successful resolution of these challenges.

12. To this end, a national Russian federal government (German: nationale russische Bundesregierung) must be established for these eastern regions, one capable of uniting the Russian nation under a single leadership in the struggle against Bolshevism. Propaganda against Bolshevism in Russia must be entrusted to this government, and it must be granted freedom of action in national and economic matters to such an extent that the national strata of the population are able to join the government.

The seat of this national Russian federal government should be Kyiv or one of the major cities on Russian soil, until Moscow or St. Petersburg are captured. In order to adapt everything to the new conditions as smoothly as possible, it is necessary to make the necessary adjustments to the current state system, which is familiar to the people. It would also be advisable to rely on the existing territorial division; however, for the de facto Russian regions, which together comprise more than 50 districts, each with a normal population of 2–3 million inhabitants, it is desirable to consolidate them into larger units (provinces), for example:

1. Novgorod (St. Petersburg).

2. Central Provinces (Moscow)

3. Russian Ukraine (German: Russisch-Ukraine)

4. North Caucasus

5. Volga

6. Northern Russia

7. Ural

8. Western Siberia

9. Eastern Siberia

Accordingly, Russia will be organized as a federal republic comprising autonomous republics and regions, or national districts for ethnic minorities, as well as provinces (German: Gau) and regions for the Russian districts themselves, which will be directly subordinate to the federal government. Overall, the central federal government and its direct subordinates will consist of: 9 district governments, each covering several provinces; 20 autonomous republics; and several autonomous regions and national districts.

13. Once the Russian National Federal Government (German: die nationale russische Bundesregierung) has been established with Germany's assistance and has consolidated its position, a peace treaty must be concluded between it, the Axis powers, and their allies. A German ambassador will be accredited to the Russian government, and a close alliance will be established between Germany and Russia. Subsequently, the Russian national federal government will join the Tripartite Pact and begin organizing a national army under German leadership.

Among the millions of Russian prisoners of war, there is sufficient manpower to form a new administration and a new army. The latter should be organized as a mixed German-Russian army [Ger. germanisch-russisches heer] composed of Germans (and other Germanic peoples) and locals, for example, in a ratio of 2:5, to ensure the necessary security.

It is also possible to make significant use of émigrés, some of whom are well-educated. One must simply be cautious and not place too much trust in their optimistic views. Moreover, care must be taken to ensure that Russian national policy is in no way launched under the banner of emigration or interpreted as such. As for national minorities, the issue of immigrants is somewhat different. There, migrants can confidently take center stage. On the other hand, for Russia itself, such a mistake would preclude the possibility of a successful outcome.

Any settlement must not take the form of a restoration of the tsarist regime, but rather a national and social internal revolution against war and Bolshevism - a national

reorganisation - bringing peace and prosperity, order and justice, under the universally accepted national slogan, which in this case is:

Russia for the Russians and no bloodshed for England and the Jews.

It is also of crucial importance that the Russian federal government extend its authority not only over European Russia, but also, in accordance with geographical realities, over all of Russia as far as the Pacific Ocean - that is, including the Urals, Siberia, Turkestan, and other territories belonging to Russia or over which it exercises political influence.

If the Soviet government had been allowed to remain in Russian Asia, a grave mistake would have been made, the consequences of which might well have been equivalent to the fatal error of the Eastern policy of 1917–1918. England and America would have continued to turn Russian Asia into a very dangerous base for their operations against Germany. Russian Asia is nearly twice the size of the United States of America, currently has a population of about 50 million people, and is undoubtedly the richest part of Russia. In any case, two great opportunities would have been missed: the supply of raw materials from Russian Asia and a breakthrough of the encirclement. One way or another, we must not be content with half-measures, but must do the job thoroughly.

15. The National Russian Federal Government must be based on the organization of the National Socialist Russian movement.

The conditions for such a development are largely in place.

First, in Russia, the Bolsheviks are known and hated as an openly Jewish movement.

Second, communism itself, despite all its fundamental differences from National Socialism, is in many ways a transitional stage leading to it. Just as communism follows liberalism in terms of evolution, so National Socialism follows communism. The Bolsheviks, against their will, effectively prepared the Russian people for a turn toward National Socialism

If they have been proclaiming socialism for 25 years, and now, in recent years, have shifted with increasing intensity to promoting nationalism, then a synthesis of national socialism is just around the corner - all the more so because the restoration of private property rights and private initiative is an urgent and fundamental necessity in Russia. The Bolshevik rulers understand perfectly well what an enormous danger this poses to the Bolshevik system. A telling expression of this is, among other things, the clumsy precision with which they avoid using the word “National Socialism” in their propaganda against Hitler and Germany. Instead, they consistently use the strange and incomprehensible to Russians word “fascism,” to which they have managed to attach a series of blood-curdling ideas. Thirdly, the vast majority of the Russian people have, on the one hand, a traditional animosity toward England, Russia’s “sworn enemy,” and, on the other hand, a sense of a certain continental commonality of interests with the Germans, coupled with respect - an attitude

that Jewish propaganda has failed to completely eradicate. The people have a long memory, and the Russian people have not forgotten how they shed blood for British interests in World War I, only to be subsequently abandoned by England to the mercy of fate and a starvation-induced death.

Thus, National Socialism has great potential in Russia, not only as a political weapon against Bolshevism, but also as a prerequisite for the merger of the German and Russian revolutions.

16. This is all the more true given that the peasant question is the most crucial issue in Russia, and National Socialism points the way to a sound and robust solution to this fundamental problem.

We must not forget that, in fact, only two words - "land and peace" - made the entire Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and led to the complete collapse of Russia's multi-million-strong army. In the civil wars, the conflict was again decided by the stance of the middle peasant class. The Bolsheviks managed to lure the peasants to their side through deception, while the counterrevolutionaries alienated them with their reactionary and anti-peasant policies.

Prior to World War I and the Russian Revolution, a major agrarian reform was carried out between 1906 and 1910. It consisted of eliminating the serf-like dependence of peasants within their communities and families - that is, organizing so-called individual and joint family ownership - and settling peasants as landowners on individual farms, while simultaneously implementing a large-scale settlement policy, particularly in Western Siberia.

Today, an even more sweeping agrarian reform is on the agenda, namely the liberation of the Russian peasantry from the yoke of the communist collective farm economy and its emergence as a free, individualistic peasantry on its own land, where, with the help of the state, it can strive to become increasingly capitalized and technically and culturally prosperous. In this way, the productive capacity of Russian agriculture will increase dramatically, and at the same time, a solid foundation for industrial development will be laid.

Just as the reversal of the first peasant emancipation and the peasantry's discontent made the Bolshevik Revolution possible, so too will the beginning of the second peasant emancipation accelerate the national revolution against Bolshevism.

We must not forget what the two words "land and peace" managed to achieve in Russia.

17. In Russia, the question of religion has always been almost as important as the peasant question. It is no coincidence that Christianity is referred to as "Russia's destiny." It is also said that the Russian people will accept as their liberator only someone who restores God

to them. This is mentioned here solely to highlight the political significance of this issue for resolving the Russian problem.

18. In historical times, three invasions of Russia were successful. The first was the Norman (Norwegian) invasion, which, originating from the Norwegian-Russian "Gardariki," led to the founding of the Russian state (which in the East was long referred to in Arabic as the "great Norman country," just as the Norwegians themselves at that time called Russia "the great Swedish land"). The second was the Tatar invasion, which gave Russia an Asian character and led to the expansion of the Russian Empire east of the Volga and into Asia. The third invasion was the Jewish invasion, which destroyed the Russian Empire and led to Bolshevik rule.

The historical fact that the Russian Empire was founded by Scandinavia was no accident. It was founded on a series of circumstances that are no less significant today than they were 1,000 years ago, and which could likely be usefully taken into account in contemporary policy toward the East. The original and true Russians, who later shared their name with the rest of the Finno-Slavic-Asian population, were the North Germanic peoples. The very name "Russe" is the oldest common name for Norway and Sweden, two peoples who, in all likelihood, migrated from Russia at that time, who then returned to Russia many centuries later, partly during the Viking Age, and founded the Russian Empire together with the remaining "Russians" on Finno-Slavic soil.

In any case, Russia is, at its core, a Nordic Germanic state, and the true renewal of the state can only occur by returning it to its original principle and restoring the operation of that principle.

We live in an era when world powers are rising and opposing one another. Russia, with its 100-million-strong Russian people, who are multiplying so rapidly and have at their disposal such a vast and rich territory, is destined to become a world power and to secure this position forever. In the face of this fact, the fragmented Western European continent has only one course of action left: Western Europe, under German leadership, must establish itself in one form or another as a world power and stand on equal footing with foreign states. Germany and the German-speaking world must unite with Russia into a Germano-Slavic world power, a great Germanic world empire, which, together with Italy, France, and Iberia, must form a great European continental power, and together with Japan and East Asia - the foundation of a new world order.

This Greater German, European world empire is merely a continuation of a process of political development that has lasted for centuries and found expression, among other things, in the historic Three Emperors' League and in Bismarck's system. At its core, it is also a revival of the legacy of the Roman Empire on European soil, where the Germans assume the role of the ancient Romans, and Berlin, Rome, and Moscow represent Byzantium.

The implementation of this political idea has been shaped and determined by the nature of Europe's entire historical development. This is also the ultimate goal of the Eastern policy proposed here. It will pave the way to victory by eliminating Russia as an active adversary, ensuring Europe's supply of Russian resources, and establishing, via Russia, a continental link between Western Europe and East Asia and India - that is, by uniting Europe and Asia. If this succeeds, the entire Eurasian continent, with its 1.65 billion inhabitants, will find itself within the united sphere of influence of three powers, pitted against barely 500 million people scattered across the globe and linked only by threats over vast sea and air routes. The outcome of this war of five continents is beyond doubt, hence the absolutely decisive importance of the Russian question.

19. As for the economic issue, it is clear that the full benefits from Russia can only be realized on the basis of the far-reaching agreement proposed here, which must be expanded into a comprehensive economic treaty. For Germany, the issue is not merely one of exploiting Russia, even though it goes without saying that it must gain as much as possible from that country. However, the best way to achieve this is to work with Russia, pursuing common interests through safe, peaceful means, and to establish a solid economic foundation. At the same time, we must secure a clear path for economic expansion in the East, as well as in the vast expanses of Russian Asia. Only the national economy can serve as a reliable foundation for such an approach.

Therefore, the Russian national federal government must sign an agreement in accordance with the economic planning of the Tripartite Pact powers dated January 20, 1943. Under this agreement, the governments of Germany and Russia must develop comprehensive economic plans covering all areas of production, transportation, and trade, as well as systematic work in specific regions of the country. But all these economic requirements must be implemented without conditions humiliating to Russia and without imposing on the Russian people demands incompatible with their national dignity or even with their very existence, or which might prompt or compel them to take up arms again to defend themselves. It is necessary to ensure a situation of mutual trust and equitable policy in the East, thereby securing the freedom of action to apply defensive measures only in the West.

Two points should be noted here:

(1) After military communism and crop failures had created a dire economic situation in Russia, Lenin, in order to save the Bolshevik Revolution, was forced to implement the so-called "New Economic Policy" in 1921, that is, to resort to private capitalist methods. These measures were sufficient for agriculture, trade, and, to some extent, industry to recover rapidly after the famine years of 1921–23.

Anyone who witnessed this remarkable development must be convinced that, for the rapid recovery of Russia's economy, it is advisable to grant economic forces sufficient freedom of

action. Such a policy is also justified by the development of the vast dormant riches in the vast territories of the East.

(2) Another issue is the problem of colonization. Anyone who has witnessed the sad fate of German colonists in Russia has little desire to support future German colonization in Russia.

The implementation of a German colonization policy in Russia with the intention of Germanizing or economically subjugating Russia is a dubious proposition. Either the plan is to use the local population as helots, or to settle colonists without special privileges - for example, as farmers on relatively large farms. In either case, the entire colonization effort risks being destroyed sooner or later and drowned in the sea of the Russian nation.

This also applies to present-day Russia. In countries that formerly belonged to Russia but now form part of Europe, the conditions for German colonization appear to be different.

But even in Russia itself, it may prove expedient to establish closed military colonies of armed peasants at strategically suitable locations: on the one hand, for security purposes, to assist the national Russian federal government in maintaining peace and order in the country; on the other hand, to lay the foundation for further Germanization. It was precisely this basic system of mixed economic and military colonies (warrior-merchants), linked by good transport routes (river channels), that once formed the basis for the establishment of the Norman Empire in Rus.

Otherwise, the principle of peaceful conquest must consist of relying solely on a limited number of outstanding individuals who know and understand the country and its people, and who conduct themselves with energy, yet with dignity and fairness. Only in this way can respect and sympathy be earned, and a positive goal achieved - but not through mass immigration of people who, lacking the most essential qualities and abilities, set themselves the goal of becoming masters and cherish the empty illusion of exploiting Russia as a colony or semi-colony. This can only lead to the creation and stoking of a source of revanchism (German: Revancheherdes). The greater their number, the more the settlers enter into direct and equal economic competition with the population as a whole. The less respect there will be, and the more hatred toward foreigners, until the colonists assimilate into the people and disappear as Germans.

In a typical Russian province, with a population of 2 to 3 million, 10 highly educated people in leadership positions, backed by 100 capable assistants, will do more for the German cause than if 100,000 people - whether capable or not - were added to their ranks.

In India, with a population of 350 million, the total number of British people in 1939 (men and women) was about 150,000. The size of the army in India was 60,000 British (and 170,000 Indians). The total number of British in the administration from top to bottom was 12,000, while there were about 20,000 British in business and the professions.

If the British had settled “millions of colonists” in India - assuming that were even possible - British rule and the number of colonists would likely have been lost long ago.

Russia is not India! Nevertheless, here too, quality and the right method are more important than quantity. Thus, we have seen that a very small number of Normans, driven by unwavering determination, founded the Rus’ Empire, and that their descendants, despite all their mistakes and degeneration, continually expanded the empire and maintained it for 1,000 years. Even during the final tsarist period, Russia was in fact ruled by a thin stratum of 100,000 landowning families (mostly of German descent), until they were replaced and destroyed by the Bolshevik regime, which, again, relied on a small minority of barely 100,000 true communists, mostly Jews.

Given this fact, one might rightly ask: what is there that cannot be accomplished in Russia today, with 100,000 handpicked and well-trained Germans who have identified the right methods for Russia and know how to apply them with both wisdom and strength?

Meanwhile, one cannot categorically rule out the possibility that a major German colonization effort in Russia is also entirely conceivable.

If we examine the history and development of the three great invasions of Russia (the Norman, Tatar, and Jewish invasions), as well as the history of the peaceful penetration of Germans into Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries, the restoration of an independent Russia in alliance with Germany and the rest of the Germanic world as a Germanic empire does not seem entirely fantastical. Especially if one takes into account the destruction wrought by the Bolshevik regime. In this case, large-scale German colonization would be not only possible but even necessary. The German peoples would have to turn to Russia with all their might to organize a true Great German Empire there, one that would occupy the same geopolitical position in the world as Germany itself does in Europe. From this, over the course of several generations, a new great nation might emerge.

Considering that this can be achieved under authoritarian state leadership, and that Norway, for example, voluntarily established a Norwegian colony in America in just 100 years—one whose population is equal to that of the home country - this opens up very significant prospects that, in any case, deserve careful consideration. German colonization of Germany from west to east underwent a similar development to some extent, not to mention the Germanization and Normanization of the British Isles, which were originally Celtic, or the Romanization of France, etc. At this fateful hour for the Germanic peoples, we must not shy away from bold decisions, provided they are made in solidarity. We must weigh our options and take the plunge so as not to miss the great opportunities that fate will not offer again and that are of decisive importance for the future of our peoples.

Nietzsche explicitly advocated such an unconditional rapprochement with Russia and anticipated a "fusion of the German and Slavic races." He prophesied: "A German-Slavic, that is, a German-Russian world order is not among the most improbable."

The resolution of the Russian question, therefore, is not beyond the realm of possibility. However, the decisive task would be to preserve the Germanic ties of such an empire and prevent German blood from serving solely to lead a hostile state.

In any case, however, it is necessary - as suggested above - to organize and strengthen the German-European Ostmark from the White Sea to the Black Sea.

20. The heart of Russia lies between St. Petersburg and Moscow. There, it is necessary to strike a blow against the Red Army with concentrated forces, establish contact with Finland and the Lapland Front, cut off the "allies'" communications through Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, occupy St. Petersburg and Moscow, and from this secure northern region, which has the shortest, best, and safest connections to the homeland, systematically, with the assistance of a national Russian federal government, conquer all of Russia, in order to establish contact with Japan and have the opportunity to advance on India; such must be the goal of the German war in Russia.

England is a world power primarily in the Indian Ocean, where it has conquered or occupied all the coastal territories. There are three routes from Europe to seize this key source of England's power:

1) the southern Balkan route,

2) the central Ukraine-Caucasus route,

3) the northern Great Russian route.

The latter option has a chance of success, as it alone eliminates the danger of a threat from the flank. Only this can lead to a fundamental settlement and reorganization within Russia itself.

The Russian national federal government must limit its military activities to participating in the defeat of Bolshevism and the pacification of the Russian territory, for our goal cannot be an imperialist, militarized Russia with an aggressive foreign policy. Our goal is a free and peaceful, self-sufficient Russia under German leadership, in close alliance with Germany and Europe, corresponding to the interests, traditions, and deepest aspirations of the religious Russian peasantry.

One might hope that the anarchic tendencies of the Russian national spirit were exhausted by the revolution and the great wars that followed, and that, having overcome the Jewish-Bolshevik temptation, Russia will establish a self-sufficient social order and transition from its previous state of flux to a more stable condition.

However, as already noted, the Russian policy proposed here is also aimed - in addition to eliminating Russia as an active adversary - at achieving two positive military objectives of decisive importance.

First, a land link with Japan will be established between the European and East Asian regions - that is, the forces of the Tripartite Pact will unite and break through the encirclement, and the Allied Chinese government in Chongqing will be definitively defeated. Germany (Europe), Russia, and Japan constitute the most natural political constellation in the world and the permanent foundation of a new world order. Their union will break the power of England and America.

Second, this policy will not only break the naval blockade but also create a counter-blockade that should lead to the collapse of the British Empire east of the Suez Canal and, thus, to the decisive defeat of England and America.

In alliance with Russia, Germany will be free and, together with Japan, will be able to launch a concentrated offensive against India.

As far back as 2,000 years ago, it was said that whoever held the key to Herat could unlock the door to India. Today, after so many centuries and seven major invasions of India via Afghanistan, those words remain as true as they were then. However, the last Russian railway station, Kushka, is located just 100 km north of Herat, and the conquest of India will shatter England's power. Then a new era will dawn for the peoples of our old continent, allowing the European community to return to its golden age.

21. I have just outlined some basic principles which, after many years of studying Russian issues and a decade spent in Russia, I consider to be of great importance for resolving the Russian question. So, when I reflect on all of the above and ask myself whether it is possible to pursue a policy that could bring us victory, salvation, and happiness to the peoples of Europe and Russia, and whether the time has come, it seems to me that so many circumstances have come to pass, bringing together the vague aspects of such a plan, that, despite all the difficulties, it can hardly be denied that it can be carried out if all opportunities for this are used wisely.

Furthermore, my opinion is that - whether it succeeds or not - this is a unique opportunity, and if the war against Russia does not succeed, it will fail everywhere.

As for the timing, it could have been more opportune, but it has hardly ever been more necessary. To advance the plan itself, we must capitalize on the psychological momentum that follows a major military victory. But the longer the war drags on, the more essential it becomes to break the enemy's will to fight, including through political means.